US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, Nos. 12-1057-cv (Lead), 12-1495-cv (Con), September 19, 2014: Certificate of historical appropriateness subject to RLUIPA; current property interest not needed to bring RLUIPA claim; multiple factors must go into discriminatory intent inquiry.
RLUIPA is the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Litchfield’s Historic District Commission (“HDC”) denied an application by the religious organization Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. (“Chabad”) for a certificate of appropriateness to alter a building in Litchfield’s historic district. The Chabad and its Rabbi Joseph Eisenbach (“Eisenbach”) challenged the decision in federal district court, claiming violation of RLUIPA and abridgement of constitutional rights.
The thrust of their claims was that the HDC action violated RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, which says that a government can’t impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the imposition of the burden meets certain tests. A prerequisite of showing a substantial burden is that it “is imposed in the implementation of a … regulation … under which a government makes … individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” Id. § 2000cc(a)(2).
The district court barred the Chabad’s claim under RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, saying that because the Connecticut law under which the HDC’s approval was required (Conn. General Statutes § 7-147a et seq) applies to any entity (with some exceptions) seeking to modify a property in a historic district, it is a neutral law of general applicability and thus could not, as a matter of law, impose a substantial burden on the Chabad’s religious exercise. The district court also held that Eisenbach lacked standing under RLUIPA. Chabad and Eisenberg appealed.
The court overruled the lower court on the applicability of the substantial burden rules to this case. It said the HDC decision under Connecticut’s statutory scheme was clearly the type of “individualized assessment” RLUIPA was meant to address. The court said the factors that may be considered to determine whether a substantial burden is imposed include whether the law is neutral and generally applicable, arbitrariness of a denial, whether the denial was conditional, and if so, whether the condition was itself a substantial burden, and whether the plaintiff had “ready alternatives.” The court remanded to the district court to determine whether the HDC denial in fact imposed a substantial burden on the Chabad’s religious exercise.
On the Chabad’s RLUIPA discrimination claim, the court held that unlike the substantial burden provision, evidence of discriminatory intent is required to establish a claim. The court found that when the district court had looked only for evidence that other comparable religious institutions had been similarly treated by the HDC, it had not looked at enough factors to properly determine intent. The court (Second Circuit Appeals) had not previously interpreted the nondiscrimination provision. The court remanded the Chabad’s discrimination claim to the district court for further consideration.
The district court had dismissed Eisenbach’s claim saying he lacked standing under RLUIPA because he did not hold some property interest that he attempted to use and which was threatened by the conduct of the HDC.
The court distinguished the determination of whether Eisenbach has a cause of action under a statute from a federal court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim. Eisenbach’s standing to pursue his RLUIPA claims, the court said, turns on whether his allegations place him in the class of plaintiffs that RLUIPA protects. The court found the HDC’s denial of the Chabad’s application and the conditions it imposed on any renewed application deprived Eisenbach of the ability to live in the facilities as proposed, even though he didn’t currently live there. That circumstance, the court held, is an alleged injury that may be redressed by relief from the district court. The court vacated the district court’s holding that Rabbi Eisenbach lacked standing under RLUIPA and remand it for determination whether he has stated a claim.
Decision available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1678458.html and http://rluipa-defense.com/docs/Chabad%20Lubavitch.pdf.